{"id":381,"date":"2023-11-01T19:33:41","date_gmt":"2023-11-01T19:33:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wpmu.mau.se\/nmict23group8\/?p=381"},"modified":"2023-11-01T19:33:44","modified_gmt":"2023-11-01T19:33:44","slug":"cyberspace-a-place-to-conquer-and-the-brussels-effect","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/wpmu.mau.se\/nmict23group8\/2023\/11\/01\/cyberspace-a-place-to-conquer-and-the-brussels-effect\/","title":{"rendered":"Cyberspace \u2013 a place to conquer and the Brussels Effect"},"content":{"rendered":"
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As I mentioned in my first post<\/a>, conflict is all around us. When I started this blog, the Western media was talking exclusively about the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and their ongoing fight on the ground and in the online world (Bond, 2023). However, things have changed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched their surprise attack on Israel (Al Lawati et al., 2023; Nakhoul & Saul, 2023). A day later, Israel declared official \u201cwar on Hamas\u201d, which allowed them to use \u201csignificant military steps\u201d against the Gaza Strip\u00a0<\/strong>(Bellamy, 2023; Gold et al., 2023). However, this conflict is significantly being fought not only on the ground but also online – with propaganda and disinformation guiding information streams that form opinions for social media consumers (Sadek & Mashkoor, 2023). However, who is governing the information that we receive?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Title photo credit: Alina Grubnyak<\/a> on Unsplash<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Data \u2013 power and knowledge<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ruppert et al. (2017) argue that \u201cdata enacts that which it represents\u201d (Ruppert et al., 2017, p.1). In other words, the data serves as a power tool for the actors it is working for. In the article, Ruppert and colleagues theorize the notion of \u201c\u2019data politics\u2019 as a field of power and knowledge\u201d (Ruppert et al., 2017, p.2). Firstly, to highlight the data’s interconnected nature to perform as \u201cgenerative of new forms of power relations and politics\u201d (Ruppert et al., 2017, p.2), the authors draw on the example of the Cambridge Analytica case which helped \u201cto swing both the US election and the UK referendum by mining data from Facebook\u201d(Ruppert et al., 2017, p.2). This showcases, that using social media data can enact behavioural change that constitutes the offline world action. Data can shape \u201cour social relations, preferences, and life chances\u201d and can change political regimes like \u201cour very democracies\u201d (Ruppert et al., 2017, p.2).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Secondly, the knowledge is generated systematically. Ruppert et al (2017) draw on Foucault’s (2007) work and elaborate that \u201cdata does not happen through unstructured social practices but through structured and structuring fields in and through which various agents and their interests generate forms of expertise, interpretation, concepts, and methods that collectively function as fields of power and <\/em>knowledge\u201d (Ruppert et al., 2017, p.3., italic in original). In other words, data is formed through a systematic collection of previously agreed-upon notions to keep, control and guide the power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Who has the power and knowledge is an ever-present question in the ComDev world. On the one hand, ITC4D and \u201csocial media may contribute to poverty alleviation, opportunities for capacity building, and a role in reducing corruption\u201d (Walsham, 2017, p.29). On the other hand, we must stress the \u201cdark side of social media such as cyber-bullying, organizing riots, and spreading hatred\u201d (Walsham, 2017, p.29). Therefore, the combination of access to data, masterful usage of it and pre-claimed expertise can give specific actors the ability to gain and keep power in the world of data and guide the discourse in the ComDev field.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Photo credit: Joshua Rawson-Harris<\/a> on Unsplash<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Digital \u2013 new territory, new rules<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The digital world is a new territory \u2013 we call it cyberspace (Ruppert et al., 2017, p.5). \u201cNext to land, water, air and space, cyberspace is the complex socio-technical setting often called the \u2018fifth domain\u2019 \u201c(Koulos, 2022, p.1). The development of technologies and the Internet has supported the borderless development of this new \u201ctype of \u2018space\u2019\u201d (Koulos, 2022, p.3). Koulos (2022) explains that cyberspace has become \u201ca territory to-be-conquered\u201d (Koulos, 2022, p.3). In the nation-state manner, this space is bound to be governed as a part of their national interest. Moreover, Koulos (2022) notes that current discourse on governing cyberspace points to nationalism tendencies: \u201ccyber-attacks, cyber-wars, cyber-defence, etc. \u2013 corresponds to the one used for real space national practices and seems to indicate the fact that cyberspace has embraced nationalism\u201d (Koulos, 2022, p.14).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although we have heard the notion that the Internet does not have borders(Satariano, 2018), \u201ccyberspace is indeed a field of confrontation for states that wish to extend their legal borders or their spheres of influence\u201d(Desforges & Gery, 2022). The authors also note that internet borders are a complex system, that contrary to physical borders, changes more dynamically. Moreover, geopolitical conflicts \u201cshape the boundaries of cyberspace by modifying existing borders and creating new ones\u201d  (Desforges & Gery, 2022). In other words, nation-states are claiming the digital world and setting their borders online.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We can see countries working towards implementing borders for their \u201csecurity\u201d. For example, China’s \u201cGreat Firewall\u201d which started in 2000 as an initiative to \u201cmonitor and censor what can and cannot be seen through an online network in China\u201d (Standford, 2010), has now grown into \u201ca giant mechanism of censorship and surveillance aimed at restricting content, identifying and locating individuals, and providing immediate access to personal records\u201d(Wang, 2020). Recently Russia’s wish to build a \u2018sovereign Internet’ has resurfaced the conversation, so that the Kremlin could gain control over the narrative about the ongoing war in Ukraine (Bateman, 2022). However, it is very unlikely that Russia will follow through with this plan as they are much more \u201cintegrated into the global internet\u201d than China was when they started to build their \u201cGreat Firewall\u201d (Bateman, 2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although nation-states want to have control over their digital territory, it is not that easy as globalization has opened the accessibility and information flow. While China and Russia are setting their local rules on their citizens’ access to the internet and setting their rules on digital products, there is a player who governs the internet borders more globally. In 2018, the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into the workings setting the administration rules on the \u201cprocessing of personal data and on the free movement of such data\u201d (European Parliament, 2016). Moreover, GDPR was accepted as a more global standard, as countries like \u201cBrazil, Japan and South Korea\u201d were looking to \u201cfollow Europe\u2019s lead \u201c (Satariano, 2018) and businesses like Meta (previously, Facebook) and Microsoft decided to roll out the GDPR to their global markets not just to their customers in the EU (Brill, 2018; Facebook Business, 2018). Satariano (2018) notes, that Europe has become the world’s leading \u201ctech watchdog\u201d(Satariano, 2018). Moreover, he also notes that \u201cwith the internet\u2019s borderless nature, the regulations are set to have an outsize impact far beyond Europe\u201d (Satariano, 2018).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Interestingly, the \u201cborderless Internet\u201d is being constrained by heavy digital fencing under national and international cyber regulations.<\/p>\n\n\n

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Photo credit: Fran\u00e7ois Genon (@genon2) on Unsplash<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Brussels Effect<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe EU\u2019s unilateral power to regulate global markets\u201d is called the \u201cBrussels effect\u201d (Bradford, 2020, p.xv). EU is in no need to look for other nations\u2019 collaboration as \u201cmarket forces alone are often sufficient to convert the EU standard into the global standard as companies voluntarily extend the EU rule to govern their worldwide operations\u201d(Bradford, 2020, p.xv). Moreover, although it is often claimed that the EU is losing its superpower in governing the world, Bradford (2020) notes that \u201cthe Brussels Effect leads to \u201cunilateral regulatory globalization,\u201d and \u201cEuropeanization\u201d, as \u201cregulations originating from a single jurisdiction penetrate many aspects of economic life across the global marketplace\u201d(Bradford, 2020, p.xiv – xv). In other words, EU is setting the rules and global market does not have a lot of space to oppose. Moreover, by doing this, the EU \u201cwields significant, unique, and highly penetrating power to unilaterally transform global markets, be it through its ability to set the standards in competition policy, environmental protection, food safety, the protection of privacy, or the regulation of hate speech in social media\u201d (Bradford, 2020, p.xiv).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

DSA and disinformation<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

And yet another EU legislation is here to dictate the tone. Digital Service Act (DSA) was launched by the European Union and took effect on August 25, 2023, (Shankar, 2023). The new digital legislation targets \u201cvery large\u201d digital platforms and aims to \u201cput in force measures to moderate illegal content and prevent, for example, the promotion of hate speech on their online platforms\u201d (Shankar, 2023). In other words, DSA is the new EU attempt to regulate information circulation in their territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Andrea Renda, a senior fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in an interview with the DW elaborated on the EU’s role in setting the example globally: “In the US, they look at the DSA as a shining example of how the EU sometimes can regulate much better than the US\u201d (Shankar, 2023). She also notes that countries like Brazil and Japan are interested in the implementation process of DSA. Moreover,\u201d Japan might even repurpose it just like they did with another piece of EU regulation called platform-to-business”(Shankar, 2023). In other words, similarly to GDPR, the DSA is on the way to setting the \u201cBrussels effect\u201d on global internet platform usage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Can DSA shape the disinformation about the war in Gaza globally?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the recent events of the Hamas and Israel war, the latest legislation by the EU could become the blueprint for how to work with global platforms when it comes to spreading disinformation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On October 10,11 and 12, 2023, Thierry Breton, European Commissioner, sent open letters to the owners of social media platforms X and Meta, and the CEO of TikTok, respectively (Goujard, 2023b). In the letters, Breton urged platforms to keep up with the DSA rules that all platforms have agreed to follow (Breton, 2023a, 2023b, 2023c; Clegg, 2023; O\u2019Carroll, 2023).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Following the terrorist attacks by Hamas against \ud83c\uddee\ud83c\uddf1, we have indications of X\/Twitter being used to disseminate illegal content & disinformation in the EU.

Urgent letter to @elonmusk<\/a> on #DSA<\/a> obligations \u2935\ufe0f pic.twitter.com\/avMm1LHq54<\/a><\/p>— Thierry Breton (@ThierryBreton) October 10, 2023<\/a><\/blockquote>